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Abstract
In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good
game, we study how the instructions’ format affects the participants’ understanding of the
experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer
instructions do not significantly improve the subjects’ understanding of the experiment; on-
screen instructions shorten average decision times with respect to on-paper instructions,
and requiring forced inputs reduces waiting times, in particular for the slowest subjects.
Consistent with cognitive load theory, we find that short, on-screen instructions which require
forced inputs improve on subjects’ comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task,
and they contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting the overall
pattern of contributions.
Keywords: Cognitive load theory, Comprehension, Distraction, Experimental instructions.
Jel code: C72, C90, H41.
As we need to use clean test tubes in chemistry experiments,
so we need to get the laboratory conditions right
when testing economic theory. (Binmore, 1999)
Experimental instructions are like test tubes in hard science experiments: they are necessary
to carry out an experiment, and they must be as neutral and “sterile” as possible. In this study
we focus precisely on this issue and run an experiment where the treatment variable is the format
used to present informationally-equivalent instructions. This allows improving control over the
variables that may affect the outcome of an economic experiment and obtaining useful insights
on the way people process the information they receive.
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Information not only yields benefits, but also entails some costs: “What information con-
sumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of infor-
mation creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among
the over-abundance of information sources that might consume it” (Simon, 1971). In light of
these considerations, we conjectured that not only the content of the instructions, but also their
format may affect (i) the subjects’ understanding of the experimental set up, (ii) their choices
during the experiment, and (iii) their decision and waiting times. To our knowledge, this is the
first economic experiment that explores this perspective.
The experimental treatments differ along three dimensions. The first one is the length of
the instructions, which is manipulated by using redundant explanations. The use of repeated
explanations, which is rooted in the latin motto repetita iuvant (repetitions are useful), is a
common technique among experimenters. It is based on the assumption that the costs associated
to repeating an explanation are negligible with respect to the potential benefits associated to a
better understanding. Others experimentalists, however, prefer using concise instructions. This
reduces the time spent in reading the instructions, but it may fail to ensure that subjects get a full
understanding of the experimental scenario, specially if they get distracted during the instruction
reading. Second, we study whether instructions written on paper and instructions presented on
the screen produce significant differences. The latter case is relevant both for on-line experiments,
where instructions are necessarily on-screen, and for experiments run through computerized
interfaces (e.g. z-Tree), where adopting on-screen instructions may help the subjects to become
familiar with the experimental environment. Finally, we consider the role of examples, comparing
the case where the examples are simply illustrated to the subject, with the case where the
examples require active participation (a forced input) by the participant.
The experiment is based on a standard public good game and is run with inexperienced
subjects. Consistent with the rich existing literature, we find that contributions are positive
and declining over time in all treatments, with a significant restart effect. Within this general
pattern, interesting differences emerge among treatments, because as subjects gain experience
contributions are lower when instructions are presented on screen rather than on paper. Using
repetitions and redundancies does not significantly improve the subjects’ understanding of the
experiment: short instructions perform equally well when compared to long instructions, except
for the case where they are presented on screen and require no active participation from the
subjects. Concerning individual characteristics, we find that impulsive subjects have a lower
understanding of the instructions, specially when instructions are short and on paper, or are on
screen and require no active participation; in all treatments subjects with better logical abilities
understand the instructions better than the others. Finally, subjects are the fastest in making
choices during the experiment when instructions are presented on screen and require forced
inputs. We conclude that short, on-screen instructions which require forced inputs improve
subjects’ comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task, and help having shorter
experimental sessions.
The paper is structured as follows. In next Section we discuss the related literature and in
Section 2 we present the experimental design. Results are presented in Section 3 and discussed
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in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1 Related Literature
As a recent science, experimental economics has relied on the rich literature in social sciences
and in statistics, and on the corresponding guidelines aimed at writing good instructions, i.e.
instructions which conduce to reliable data. When writing and designing surveys and ques-
tionnaires, the typical recommendations require making questions easily understandable, using
words and questions that have the same meanings for all participants and avoiding ambigui-
ties. Parsimony and clarity are often suggested because long questions and long surveys might
confuse the subjects, increase the time to collect the answers and, ultimately, increase research
costs. Sentences should be constructed in the simplest possible way, and avoid using passive
form, double or triple negations; wording should be as consistent as possible with the cultural
level of the participants (see Fowler, 1995, among others). Demand effects should be carefully
avoided and, consistent with Tversky and Kahneman (1981)’s results on framing, special care
is recommended when handling suggestive or emotionally loaded words and sentences.
Within the above mentioned guidelines, experimental instructions are often written accord-
ing to the experimenter’s sensitivity and experience. Scarce attention is paid to the results of
a branch of experimental psychology called instructional design theory, whose goal is to study
how instructions should be designed to help people learning, understanding and applying a pre-
determined set of principles, concepts and procedures. Within this research field, a major role is
played by the cognitive load theory and by a number of empirical studies which test instructions
involving different working memory loads (see van Merrie¨nboer and Sweller, 2005, for a review).
Among other results, the available evidence suggests that subjects’ understanding of the instruc-
tions is reduced when information is split among multiple sources, or when seemingly useful but
non-essential explanatory material (e.g. a commentary on a diagram) is provided (Chandler
and Sweller, 1991). On the contrary, understanding is improved when people can both read and
listen to the instructions, possibly because working memory has partially independent pathways
for processing visual and auditory stimuli (Mousavi et al., 1995). Inexperienced subjects seem
to benefit more from studying instructions made of worked examples than from instructions
which require solving problems, but for experienced subjects worked examples are redundant
and problem solving yields better performance (Kalyuga et al., 2001). The bottom line of this
literature is that the effectiveness of instructions increases if they succeed in focusing the sub-
jects’ attention on the relevant information, if the cognitive load required to understand the
instructions is low, and if prior skills or knowledge, or familiarity with the task, are exploited
(van Merrie¨nboer and Sweller, 2010).
The role of attention, cognitive demand and individual behavior has been investigated in
some recent economic experiments. Considering a large sample of individuals, Burks et al.
(2009), Oechssler et al. (2009), and Dohmen et al. (2010) find that cognitive skills are correlated
with measured risk and time preferences. Dave et al. (2010) compare two alternative procedures
for eliciting risk references, with different degrees of complexity. They find that the correlations
between numeracy proficiency and preferences elicitation may be obscured by the difficulty of
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the elicitation procedure. In particular, the two procedures yield similar results for subjects
with high mathematical skills, while for subjects with low mathematical ability the simple pro-
cedure generates less noise and has a similar predictive accuracy. Interestingly, when the task
interface includes visual displays of the gambles and images of money to be more user-friendly,
no relationship between math skills and risk attitudes is found (Eckel et al., 2007).
The above experiments investigate the relations between individual cognitive skills and indi-
vidual behavior. By contrast, our experiment studies the relation between individual cognitive
skills and the format used to present informationally-equivalent experimental instructions. It
does not focus on framing, nor on the effect of experimental tasks with different degree of
complexity, but it investigates the consequences of different instruction formats given the same
framing and the same experimental task to be performed.
2 Experimental design
The experiment is based on a standard public good game. Subjects play in fixed groups of four
for three rounds of 12 periods each. Before periods 13 and 25 they are randomly re-matched, so
that two subjects cannot belong to the same group for more than one round (absolute stranger
matching). At the beginning of every period, each subject receives 20 points which she can
contribute to a common project, in part o totally. Total contributions to the common project
are doubled by the experimenter and equally distributed to the four group members. All points
not contributed to the common project remain in the subject’s private account. After 36 periods,
subjects fill in a demographic questionnaire and a set of questions aimed at measuring cognitive
and linguistic skills. Cognitive skills are assessed using two IQ-type questions and the Cognitive
Reflection test proposed by Frederick (2005).1 Linguistic skills are assessed via a German test
routinely used at the Max Planck Institute of Economics of Jena to check whether subjects have
sufficient knowledge of the German language.2 After the linguistic test, subjects are paid in
private and leave the lab.
The experiment includes 4 treatments, named Baseline, Short-on-paper, Short-on-screen,
and Short-active. The sole difference across treatments lies in the instructions format (see Table
1), while the experimental setup and the actions available to the subjects are identical across
treatments
The Baseline treatment instructions are based on Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000). They are printed
on paper and given to each participant, and consist of five parts. In the first part, subjects
are welcomed. In the second part, the public good game is described. This part includes
information on the endowment of 20 points each subject receives, how the 20 points can be
allocated and how payoffs are obtained, depending on the choices of the group members. In the
third part, subjects are explained step-by-step the two main stages they would go through during
the experiment, which correspond to the two screens they will see, named “Your choice” and
1A translation of these questions is reported in Appendix A
2Subjects must fill in a (German) text choosing between a list of words. Overall, they have to answer 12
questions.
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Treatment Words (no.) Medium Example
Baseline 1091 on paper read-only
Short-on-paper 621 on paper read-only
Short-on-screen 621 on screen read-only
Short-active 633 on screen forced input
Notes: No. of words refers to the German version of the instructions.
Table 1: Summary of the treatments.
“Results”, respectively. To provide visual support, screenshots are printed on the instructions. In
the fourth part (“Additional information”) subjects are given additional information concerning
the number of rounds, the matching protocol and the conversion rate of the points earned during
the game. In the fifth section, two illustrative examples are provided. After correctly answering
the control questions, subjects start playing.
In the three remaining treatments (Short-on-paper, Short-on-screen, and Short-active) in-
structions are substantially shorter than in the Baseline treatment (1091 vs. 621 or 633 words,
depending on the treatment). This is obtained by using the instructions of the Baseline treat-
ment as a starting point, and then cutting redundancies, repetitions and minor details. The
short version of the instructions is therefore an extract of the Baseline instructions, but it does
not differ from the long version in the wording, nor in the information or in the explanations
provided to the subjects.3 The differences between the three treatments with short instructions
consist in the instructions format: in the Short-on-paper treatment instructions are presented
on paper; in the Short-on-screen treatment they are presented on screen; in the Short-active
treatment they are presented on screen and the two examples are replaced by forced input
choices.
It is important to observe that repetitions and redundancies are cut from the Baseline in-
structions in such a way that the short instructions meet the following criteria. First, the
subjects are instructed on what they have to do (i.e. that they have to contribute between 0
and 20 points); then they are explained the consequences of their choices (i.e. how the payoff
corresponding to theirs and their opponents’ choices is determined). Additional information
which is not strictly required to understand what a subject has to do and what are the conse-
quences of her choices (e.g., where the number of period is shown on the screen, the conversion
rate of the experimental currency, etc.) is provided only afterwards. Interestingly, providing in-
formation following the above steps is particularly natural in the treatments where instructions
are presented on screen (Short-on-screen and Short-active treatments) because in each period
a subject goes through two screens. In the first one she is required to make her choice, in the
second one she receives information on the others’ choices and on her payoffs. Hence, what the
subject has to do is the relevant information contained the first screen, while information on the
consequences of her choices appears in the second screen. Consistently, in the Short-on-screen
and Short-active treatments instructions are presented according to the effective sequence of
3An English translation of the instructions is reported in Appendix B.
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screens the subjects will see.4
To enhance control over possible confounding factors, instructions were recorded in advance;
the audio file was then played aloud with speakers during the instruction phase in all treat-
ments. Hence, during this phase, the participants could both listen and read the instructions
(on paper or on screen, depending on the treatment). After the instruction phase, subjects had
to answer some control questions to verify their comprehension of the experimental set up. The
experiment did not start until all subjects had answered the control questions correctly. The
software recorded the number of mistakes made by each subject, and the total time each subject
needed to answer all questions correctly, which are the measures we use to evaluate the subject’s
comprehension of the instructions depending on the different formats.
The experiment was run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the Max Plank
Institute in Jena, in November and December 2010. The software was developed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 2 sessions per treatment, with 16 subjects per session.5 Subjects
were recruited through the ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2004), and were randomly assigned to
the treatments. None of them had previously participated in other experiments.6 Upon arrival,
subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals. After
the instruction phase, and for the whole duration of the experiment, a printed copy of the
instructions was given to all participants. Sessions lasted on average 55 minutes, including
instructions and payment. Subjects earned on average 13 Euros, with a show-up fee of 2.5
Euros.
3 Results
In this section we first describe the pattern of contributions across treatments. Then we discuss
how the different formats affect the subjects’ understanding of the game. Finally, we analyze
how the subjects’ decision and waiting time vary across treatments.
3.1 Contributions
Figure 1 presents the trend of average contributions across treatments, and across rounds. The
qualitative pattern is substantially in line with the previous experiments (see, for example,
Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996).
4In addition, the on-screen instructions are such that the screen is divided in two parts: in the top part there is
the text of the instructions, while in the remaining part the subjects can see the corresponding screenshot. When
the instructions describe some relevant object in the screenshot (e.g., ‘after you have made your choice, press the
“ok” button’), arrows appear on the screen to help locating the object (e.g., the arrow points to the “ok” button,
see Figure B.3). This technique is commonly used in software tutorials to teach a beginner where buttons and
commands are located on the screen.
5In fact, we ran 9 sessions, but we had to drop data from the first one due to technical problems with the
software.
6To control for possible asymmetries across treatments, we collected data about subjects’ individual charac-
teristics by means of a questionnaire which was administered at the end of each session. Aggregate results from
the questionnaire are presented in Appendix A.
6
Figure 1: Contribution
Result 1 In all treatments: the initial average contribution is between a half and two thirds of
the endowment; average contributions decrease within each round; a significant restart effect is
observed at the beginning of round 2 and round 3.
Result 1 shows that the four formats used in the experiment do not produce “anomalous”
responses in the participants’ experimental choices, as the overall trend of contributions is in
line with the existing literature on public good games for all formats of instructions. Yet, there
are some differences across treatments both when considering the initial contribution (i.e. the
average contribution in period 1 of round 1) and the average contribution for each round (Table
2).
treatment period 1 round 1 round 2 round 3
Baseline 13.0 10.1 9.3 8.8
Short-on-paper 13.1 11.8 9.8 9.8
Short-on-screen 9.2 8.8 6.3 7.2
Short-active 13.3 11.0 6.6 6.7
Table 2: Average contribution by round.
The initial contribution is significantly lower in the Short-on-screen treatment than in other
treatments (Wilcoxon, p < 0.05 for all three comparisons), but no significant differences emerge
among the Baseline, the Short-on-paper and the Short-active treatments. To study whether
and how contributions differ across treatments as subjects gain experience, we run three linear
regressions, one for each round. Among the independent variables we include dummies for the
Short-on-paper, Short-on-screen, and Short-active treatments; the variable Period introduces a
linear time trend and helps understanding the role of experience. In addition, we control for the
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Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
Short-on-paper 1.884 (1.478) 0.214 (1.421) 0.606 (1.381)
Short-on-screen -1.252 (1.393) -2.870* (1.399) -1.325 (1.249)
Short-active 1.234 (1.127) -2.302*** (0.463) -1.688* (0.740)
Period -0.475*** (0.100) -0.537*** (0.065) -0.677*** (0.065)
Constant 18.918*** (4.965) 10.653** (4.378) 15.572*** (3.392)
Indiv. characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 1536 1536 1536
R-squared 0.133 0.180 0.196
Notes: standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in parentheses). In this and in the following
regressions, the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Table 3: Linear regression on contributions.
set of individual characteristics listed in Appendix A.7
Regressions’ results are reported in Table 3. Consistent with Result 1 and Figure 1, the
estimated coefficient of the variable Period is negative and significant. In addition, we find that,
in round 1, contributions are not significantly different across treatments.8
In the next rounds, however, average contributions are lower in the treatments where instruc-
tions are presented on screen, rather than on paper. More precisely, we find that the average
contributions in the Short-active treatment are between 20% and 30% lower than those in the
Baseline treatment and the regression results show that the difference is statistically significant
(p < 0.01 in round 2 and p < 0.10 in round 3, see Table 3). A difference also emerges when
comparing the average contributions in the Short-on-screen treatment with those in the Baseline
treatment, but it is weaker (p < 0.10 in round 2 and p > 0.10 in round 3).
Result 2 In rounds 2 and 3 average contributions are lower when instructions are presented on
screen rather than on paper.
3.2 Comprehension of the instructions
Result 2 suggests that average contributions are lower in the treatments in which instructions are
presented on screen than in the treatments where instructions are presented on paper. A possible
explanation for this finding is that on screen instructions help subjects to better understand the
strategic environment of the game, which would justify the faster convergence to the Nash
equilibrium of the static game. Support for this explanation requires the participants in the
7Of these characteristics, only risk aversion has a significant effect in all three rounds: subjects reporting a
higher degree of risk aversion on average tend to contribute less.
8According to a Wald test on coefficients, there is a difference only between the Short-on-screen and the
Short-active treatments, although it is weakly significant (p < 0.10).
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on-screen treatments to perform well in the control questions. To test whether this is the case,
we consider (i) the number of wrong answers given by each subject in the control questions,
and (ii) the amount of time spent to complete the whole test correctly. Both measures provide
valuable information about the subjects’ level of comprehension of the instructions. We assume
that a participant who has had problems in understanding the experimental set up may either
answer quickly but make many mistakes, or answer correctly but be very slow (because she
needs time to think and possibly to re-read the instructions). Our measure of comprehension
of the instructions is built in order to take into account both possibilities. First, we make two
rankings. The first one is based on the total number of wrong answers given by each participant
in the control questions: the higher the rank attributed to a participant, the lower the number
of mistakes she made. The second ranking is based on the total time spent to answer all the
questions: the higher the rank, the fastest the participant in correctly answering all control
questions. For every subject, we then take the minimum between these two ranks and we use it
as a measure of her comprehension of the instructions. Hence, our measure is high for subjects
that are both fast and correct in answering (which is consistent with a good understanding of
the instructions), and it is low for subjects that were either very slow or that made too many
mistakes, or both. Figure 2 reports the distribution of this measure of comprehension across
treatments.9
Figure 2: Understanding of instructions across treatments.
9The white vertical line amid the boxes indicates the median, the left and right sides of the boxes indicate
the 25th and the 75th percentiles, respectively, and the extremes of the whiskers represent the upper and lower
adjacent lines.
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The median level of comprehension is much lower in the Short-on-screen treatment than the
other treatments, and the difference is statistically significant according to Wilcoxon tests.10 No
significant differences emerge among the other three treatments.
Result 3 Comprehension of the instructions is significantly lower in the Short-on-screen treat-
ment, and similar in the Baseline, Short-on-paper and Short-active treatments.
To dig deeper into this result, we run an additional regression to study whether our measure
of comprehension is correlated with the subjects’ logical abilities, their impulsiveness, their
linguistic skills and their education. Neglecting for a moment the possible treatment effects, we
pool together the data from all treatments. The results are reported in Table 4.
coeff. (s.e.)
graduated -9.338 (5.934)
impulsiveness -11.895*** (2.377)
IQ-classification 8.525 (8.303)
IQ-logic 12.974** (5.121)
German test -2.399 (3.078)
Constant 62.049*** (10.156)
N.obs. 128
R-squared 0.266
Notes: standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in
parentheses).
Table 4: Linear regression on understanding.
Interestingly, the subjects who gave the correct answer to the IQ-logic question tend to
perform significantly better in the control questions (p < 0.05), while impulsiveness is negatively
correlated with the level of comprehension of the instructions (p < 0.01). To check whether
the correlation between these individual characteristics and understanding is constant across
treatments, we run two additional regressions in which we separately include impulsiveness and
IQ-logic as regressors, together with their interactions with the dummies Short-on-paper, Short-
on-screen, and Short-active. The corresponding results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 shows that impulsiveness is correlated with low comprehension in all treatments. The
negative effect of impulsiveness is exacerbated in the Short-on-paper and Short-on-screen treat-
ments (p < 0.001 for both treatments), while in the Short-active treatment is is not significantly
different from the Baseline (p > 0.10).
Table 6 instead shows that the subjects who answered correctly to the IQ-logic question
understand better the instructions in all treatments, with no significant difference among treat-
ments (p > 0.10 for all three treatment dummies).
10p < 0.05 for Short-on-screen vs. Baseline, and for Short-on-screen vs. Short-active; p < 0.10 for Short-on-
screen vs. Short-on-paper
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coeff. (s.e.)
impulsiveness -11.802*** (2.559)
Short-on-paper x impulsiveness -5.347*** (0.559)
Short-on-screen x impulsiveness -9.014*** (0.482)
Short-active x impulsiveness 0.511 (1.311)
Constant 78.728*** (6.179)
N.obs. 128
R-squared 0.273
Notes: standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in
parentheses).
Table 5: Linear regression: understanding and impulsiveness.
coeff. (s.e.)
IQ-logic 29.469*** (6.308)
Short-on-paper x IQ-logic -6.275 (9.444)
Short-on-screen x IQ-logic -21.690 (15.883)
Short-active x IQ-logic -3.895 (11.106)
Constant 39.531*** (3.299)
N.obs. 128
R-squared 0.126
Notes: standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in
parentheses).
Table 6: Linear regression: understanding and logical abilities.
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Result 4 In all treatments, impulsiveness and comprehension are negatively correlated, while
logical abilities and comprehension are positively correlated. In the Short-active treatment im-
pulsive subjects’ comprehension is as good as in the Baseline. In the Short-on-paper and in the
Short-on-screen treatments the negative impact of impulsiveness on understanding is stronger.
3.3 Decision and waiting time
The last part of our analysis focuses on the effects that the different formats of instructions have
on the subjects’ decision time and, consequently, on the time subjects spend just waiting for the
other participants to make their choices.
Figure 3 presents box-plots summarizing the distribution of subjects’ average decision time
in period 1 of round 1, and across all periods of the other three rounds. The mean decision time
in the first period is between 25% and 30% shorter in the Short-active treatment (11.2”) than in
the Baseline (15.8”), Short-on-paper (16.8”), and Short-on-screen (14.8”) treatments. Results
from Wilcoxon tests indicate that the difference is highly significant.11
To test whether the difference in decision time between the Short-active and the Baseline
treatment remains significant as subjects gain experience, we run three additional regressions –
one for each round – in which the dependent variable is the individual decision time in a period.
Among the dependent variables we include dummies for the Short-on-paper, Short-on-screen,
and Short-active treatments. In addition, we include variable Period to check for the presence
of a linear time trend, and we control for the set of individual characteristics listed in Appendix
A.12 The regressions’ results show that the difference persists until the second round, while in
the third round the difference is no more significant.
A second finding that emerges from Figure 3 is that, in all three rounds, the distribution of
decision times in the Short-on-paper and Short-on-screen treatments is more disperse that in
the Baseline and in the Short-active treatments. Levene’s tests on equality of variances confirm
that in treatments Short-on-paper and Short-on-screen the variance in decision time in the first
period is significantly higher than in the Baseline treatment (p < 0.01 for both treatments),
while no significant difference emerges between the Baseline and the Short-active treatment.
Levene’s tests also allow to conclude that, in all three rounds, the variance in the subjects’
average decision time is significantly smaller in the Short-active treatment than in the Short-on-
paper and in the Short-on-screen treatments (the difference is significant at the 5% level for all
rounds and for all bilateral comparisons). This information is relevant because in our experiment
(and in many other economic experiments) a new period begins only when all participants have
made their choices. Hence, if a participant is fast in making her choice, she must wait until the
slowest participant has taken her choice. As a consequence, a large variance in decision times
has a direct impact on the waiting times experienced by fast subjects, i.e. on the amount of idle
time they have to wait before the other participants to the experiment make their choice. For
each treatment, Table 7 presents the average waiting and decision time across all periods of all
11p < 0.01 for the comparisons with the Baseline and Short-on-paper treatments, and p < 0.05 for the compar-
ison with the Short-on-screen treatment.
12The regressions results are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
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Figure 3: Decision time across rounds and treatments.
rounds. Notably, in the Short-active treatment the average waiting time is substantially shorter
treatment decision time waiting time
Baseline 10.4 9.5
Short-on-paper 11.0 16.7
Short-on-screen 10.0 15.8
Short-active 7.6 9.7
Table 7: Decision and waiting time across treatments.
than in the Short-on-paper and Short-on-screen treatments.
Result 5 In the Short-active treatment, subject are the fastest in making choices, and the wait-
ing time is as short as in the Baseline. In the other Short-on-paper and Short-on-screen treat-
ments subjects are as slow as in the Baseline in making choices, but the waiting time is much
longer.
4 Discussion
Experimentalists often rely on the assumption that instructions are adequate, which implies
that the subjects’ decisions are robust with respect to instructions (Smith, 2002). In this paper
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we show that the format used to present instructions that are informationally equivalent may
significantly affect the subjects’ understanding of the experimental set up, their decision times,
and their choices during the experiment.
While it is widely acknowledged that limited attention and cognitive load may significantly
impact on people’s understanding and behavior, very few economic experiments have focused on
explicitly studying it. In our experiment we show that, for inexperienced subjects, redundancies
and repetitions do not significantly improve understanding (Baseline vs. Short-on-paper). No-
tice that instructions in the Baseline treatment are very close to the ones adopted in the most
recent and prominent experiments on public goods. They are the outcome of a long refinement
process, are widely adopted, and generally recognized as good instructions. Yet, they contain
repetitions and redundancies, and we show that they can be safely removed. With short in-
structions, reading time decreases by about 38%.13 Although this effect might seem negligible,
one has to bear in mind that ours is a single-task experiment, and that the required task is
simple. In sessions with multiple and more complicated tasks, instructions may well absorb a
consistent proportion of the total session time. In these cases, shortening instructions by 30-
40% may produce relevant benefits, both for the experimenter and for the subjects. On the
one hand, the experimenter saves money because one has to pay subjects according to the time
spent in the lab, which implies that longer sessions are more costly. On the other hand, our own
experience suggests that exposing subjects to excessively long instructions induces boredom and
distraction, and possibly create undesirable noise in the data.
In tailoring the instructions for the on screen treatments, we followed the technique used to
design tutorials, which are commonly used to familiarize a person with a new software. To help
subjects getting to grips with the z-Tree interface, we presented the information step-by-step.
As a result, subjects in the Short-on-screen treatment were indeed faster than in the Short-
on-paper treatment. Yet, they did not pay enough attention to the content of the instructions
and, in the control questions, they made significantly more errors than all others. This may be
due to the fact that our sample of subjects is made of students, who are more used to study
on paper books and notes, and that they paid more attention when reading on paper than
when they were passively exposed to instructions written on the screen. We cannot conclude,
however, that on screen instructions are bad for comprehension because we find a significant
difference in understanding between the Short-on-screen and the Short-active treatment. In the
latter case, the subjects had to exert active effort, instead of just being passive recipients of
information. Interestingly, in our experiment being active simply meant being required to enter
a forced input, rather than just being exposed to the corresponding worked example. Despite
the fact that no particular cognitive effort is required to make this action, it seems that this
minimum requirement has been useful in maintaining the subjects’ focus on the instructions and
in helping them to understand the experimental set up.
13Instruction reading time, was 8 minutes in the Baseline treatment, 6 minutes in the Short-on-paper, 6 minutes
and 30 seconds in the Short-on-screen, and 8 minutes in the Short-active treatment. These figures include time
to answer questions from the participants and, only in the Short-active treatment, time for entering the forced
inputs.
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5 Conclusion
Writing good experimental instructions is not a trivial task. The completeness and accurate-
ness of instructions is critical to ensure that the subjects understand the experimental scenario,
and that they know what they are required to do and the consequences of their actions. In
most experiments particular effort is devoted to ensure that subjects understand the experi-
ment, including aspects of the experimental design that might lead the theoretical predictions
in different directions (e.g. the matching procedure and the information available to other par-
ticipants). Moreover, experimenters are well aware of the fact that minor details in instructions
may have large effects on the subjects’ behavior, and thus try to write good instructions in order
to minimize such distortions.
Interestingly, other important features of the instructions are often left to the experimenter’s
experience, sensitivity and personal taste. This paper is a methodological contribution to the
literature on experimental economics, and it is aimed at improving control over the variables
that can affect an economic experiment. We focus on three specific aspects. First, we consider
the length of the instructions. Some experimenters use repetitions in their instructions, with the
idea that this may improve subjects’ understanding of the experiment without harm. Others
prefer more concise instructions, which shortens the time spent in reading the instructions, but
may fail to provide full understanding of the scenario. To understand whether repetitions and
redundancies can be safely avoided, we compare treatments where instructions contain the same
information, but differ in the use of repeated explanations. Second, we study whether there is a
difference between instructions written on paper and instructions presented on the screen. The
latter possibility is relevant because an increasing number of experiments adopts a computerized
interface, and presenting instructions on the screen might help the subjects getting to grips with
the computerized environment through which the experiment takes place. Finally, we compare
a treatment where examples are simply illustrated to the subjects, with a treatment where the
examples require active participation (a forced input).
We study the impact of these differences on inexperienced subjects playing a standard pub-
lic good game, one of the most widely studied games in experimental economics. The overall
results on the subjects’ contributions are compatible with the existing literature, but we find
significant differences in the subjects’ understanding of the experimental set up, the decision
times, and the contributions made during the experiment, depending on the experimental treat-
ment. Contributions are lower when the instructions are presented on screen rather than on
paper. When considering comprehension, we find no significant difference across treatments,
except when instructions are presented on screen and require no active participation to the sub-
jects. Individual differences matter: in all treatments impulsive subjects have more problems
in understanding the experimental set up, while subjects with good logical skills have a better
comprehension. These findings are consistent with the cognitive load theory and the idea that
bounded rationality may determine a trade-off between the amount of attention devoted to the
instructions and the cognitive effort required to the subjects.
Ours is the first experiment on this issue. To single out in the neatest possible way the
effects of different instruction formats, we invited only inexperienced subjects, and we focused
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on a simple and extremely popular game. It is still an open question whether the results we get
extend to different subject-pools, and different games. This is left for future research.
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Appendix A Individual Characteristics
Individual characteristics are roughly homogeneous across treatments. The variable Impulsive-
ness measures the number of mistakes made in the Cognitive Reflections test. Similarly, the
variable German test measures the number of wrong answers given in the test for linguistic
skills.
characteristic Baseline Short-on paper Short-on screen Short-active
male 0.500 ∼ 0.375 ∼ 0.469 >∗ 0.250
age 21.781 ∼ 22.406 ∼ 22.188 >∗ 20.969
risk aversion 5.906 ∼ 6.063 ∼ 5.594 ∼ 5.469
IQ-classification 0.781 ∼ 0.906 ∼ 0.844 ∼ 0.781
IQ-logic 0.625 ∼ 0.625 ∼ 0.656 ∼ 0.594
impulsiveness 1.688 ∼ 1.375 <∗∗ 1.938 ∼ 1.750
German test 1.063 ∼ 0.750 ∼ 1.125 ∼ 0.969
graduated 0.125 <∗ 0.313 ∼ 0.313 >∗∗ 0.094
Notes: The symbol ∼ indicates that the difference is not significant at the 10% level according to a Wilcoxon-
Mann Withney test; the symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate that the test returns a p-value smaller than 0.1, 0.05 and
0.01, respectively.
Table A.1: Individual characteristics: differences across treatments
The Cognitive Reflection test (Frederick, 2005)
• A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines
to make 100 widgets?
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake?
“IQ-logic” question: “Indicate the element that completes the series.”
“IQ-classification” question: “Which, among these diagrams, represents the relation among:
ORANGES - CITRUSES - FRUIT”
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Appendix B Instructions
We report the instructions for the Baseline treatment, translated from German. Sentences in
Bold are as in the original version.
The sentences in italics were cut from the Baseline treatment to produce the short version of the
instructions (Short-on-paper, Short-on-screen, Short-active)
The adjustments needed for the on-screen treatments (Short-on-screen, Short-active) are [within
brackets].
Welcome!
You are now taking part in an economic experiment financed by the Max Plank Institute of
Economics. This institution supports and finances economic research to advance knowledge on
how people make decisions.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money,
depending on your decisions. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with
care.
The amount of money you will earn with each decision you will make will be added up and paid
to you in cash at the end of the session.
Every participant receives the same information and is reading the same instructions.
INSTRUCTIONS
Before starting let us inform you that communication is not allowed. Please, do
not communicate with the other participants during the experiment! If you violate
this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. In such a
case you will not receive the money you earned during the experiment, nor the fixed fee of 2.50
euros that we pay to all participants who showed up for the experiment on time.
Should you have any questions raise your hand and we will answer in private. Neither your
question, nor the relative answer will be announced aloud to the other participants in this room.
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later.
We first introduce you to the basic decision situation. We will ask you to answer a few control
questions at the end of these instructions, to help you to understand the decision situation.
The Decisional Situation
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You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on
the allocation of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can
invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do not invest into the project, will
automatically remain in your private account.
Your income from the private account:
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. No one except you
earns anything from your private account.
Your income from the project:
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the project. On the other
hand, you will also get a payoff from the other group members’ investments. The income for
each group member will be determined as follows:
Income from the project = sum of all contributions × 0.5
Total Income
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income from
the project:
Total Income =
Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project) +
Income from the project = (0.5 × sum of all contributions to the project)
Now that you know the basic decision situation we will describe step by step the screens you
will go through.
Your Choice
The experiment includes the decision situation just described to you. You will be paid at the end
of the experiment based on the decisions you make in this experiment.
As you know, you will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member
receives 20 points, and must decide how to use them. You and the other group members have to
decide how many points you contribute to a project. Each point you do not contribute to the
project, will automatically remain in your private account (see Fig. B.1).
To indicate your contribution, use the ”+” and ”-” buttons. To confirm your choice, you have
to click the ”OK” button.
Results
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Figure B.1: Your Choice
When everybody has made her choice, you will see the RESULTS screen. The screen will show
(see Fig. B.2):
- your contribution to the project
- the contribution to the project by the other 3 group members
- the total contribution of your group
Your earnings from the project is computed by the pc multiplying the total contributions by 2
and dividing equally among the 4 group members:
YOUR EARNINGS FROM THE PROJECT= 2× total contributions4
This formula is equivalent to the one you have seen before, when we introduced the decision
situation.
[In other words: Income from the project=sum of all contributions × 0.5]
Your earnings also depend on the points you have in your private account. Hence, for each
choice you make your earning are equal to the sum of your earning from the project and the
earnings in your private account.
Additional information
The experiment consists of 36 periods. The number of the current period is always displayed
in the top-left corner of the screen. Your task is the same in all 36 periods. In every period,
you have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project, and how
many points you want to put into your private account.
20
Figure B.2: Your Choice
The composition of the groups changes randomly every 12 periods. So your group consists of
the same four people for 12 periods, after which you will be randomly grouped with other
3 people. People that are in your group once can never be re-assigned to your group in the
future. This means that you will be part of 3 groups and that you will never interact with the
same participants for more than 12 periods.
Total earnings from the experiment
After the last period you will see a screen summarizing your total earnings from the experiment.
You will read the total amount of points earned during the experiment. Points will be converted
into Euros at the rate:
1 point= 2.5 cent
In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.5 Euros for your participation.
At the end of the experiment, please remain seated and quiet until we call you for the payment.
You will be paid in cash, and in private. No other participant will be able to know the payment
you receive.
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As illustrative examples, consider the following cases.
Example 1
Suppose you contribute 14 points to the project (and you keep 6 points in your private account).
[Please select the corresponding amount using your mouse]14.
Suppose the sum of the contributions of the others is 46 points. The value of the project is
(14+46)x2=120. You and the other members of the group each earn 120/4=30 points out of
the project. Your earnings for this period are 30 + 6 =36 points.
14This sentence was present only in the Short-active treatment
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Example 2
Suppose now you contribute 0 points to the project (and you keep 20 points in your private
account). [Please select the corresponding amount using your mouse]15
Suppose the sum of the contributions of the others is 9 points.
The value of the project is (0+9)x2=18.
You and each member of the group earn 18/4=4.5 points out of the project.
Your earnings for this period are 4.5 + 20 =24.5 points.
To test your understanding, please answer the following questions using the mouse. They have
no consequences on your final earnings.
15This sentence was present only in the Short-active treatment.
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Figure B.3: Example of instructions for the Short-on-screen and the Short-active treatment.
Notes: The text reads as “To indicate your contribution, use the ‘+’ and ‘-’ buttons. To confirm your choice,
you have to click the ‘OK’ button.”
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Appendix C Additional regressions
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
Short-on-paper 0.440 (0.724) 0.022 (0.307) 0.633 (0.399)
Short-on-screen -0.416 (0.523) 0.070 (0.167) 0.673** (0.215)
Short-active -2.094*** (0.578) -0.735** (0.221) -0.440 (0.355)
Period -0.630*** (0.040) -0.130*** (0.018) -0.101*** (0.011)
Constant 13.343*** (1.344) 6.946*** (1.283) 4.616*** (1.283)
Indiv. characteristics Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 1536 1536 1536
R-squared 0.267 0.065 0.075
Notes: standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in parentheses).
Table C.1: Linear regression on decision times.
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